

Our house, in the middle of our street? Analyzing the votes of the Chilean Constitutional Convention of 2021-2022*

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Abstract

This study examines the voting patterns of delegates at the Chilean Constitutional Convention (CC), held from 2021 to 2022, tasked with drafting a new constitution. Employing novel techniques to summarize and analyze the composition and voting patterns of CC members, this research provides a comparative advantage over traditional methods like Nominat. Furthermore, it scrutinizes the voting behavior of indigenous representatives, examining their alignment or divergence from established political coalitions.

Key Words: Chile, Constitutional Convention, Ethnic quotas.

JEL Classification: C35, D72, H11.

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Our house (*Something tells you*)
(*That you've got to move away from it*)
[Madness (Our House, 1983)]

1 Introduction

Perplexed, the World witnessed the violence that erupted in Chile in October 2019. After weeks of unrest and protests, then President Sebastián Piñera, expressed hope that a new Constitution would serve as “everybody’s house” (“*la casa de todos*”, in Spanish).¹ A Constitutional Convention (CC) was subsequently elected to draft a new Constitution.

The CC, adhering to gender quotas, initially consisted of 155 members (77 women and 78 men),² and included ethnic quotas, resulting in 17 members representing indigenous populations.³

The CC’s deliberations began on July 4, 2021, and concluded a year later with a proposed Constitution. However, a referendum on September 4, 2022, saw nearly 62% of voters rejecting this proposal.

A contentious aspect of the proposal was the transformation of Chile into a Plurinational State with special seats in representative institutions for ethnic groups and the establishment of differentiated judicial systems.

The concept of reserved seats for ethnic groups is not unique and is practiced in various countries including Bolivia, Colombia, Fiji, India, Mexico and New Zealand.⁴

The rationale for such special treatment is to ensure representation of unique and socially valuable idiosyncrasies. However, this approach potentially conflicts with the principle of equal representation and equality under

¹See <https://prensa.presidencia.cl/comunicado.aspx?id=134617>

²It ended with 77 men after one male constituent was forced to resign.

³The ethnic groups represented were: Atacameño, Aymara, Chango, Colla, Diaguita, Kawashkar, Mapuche, Quechua, and Rapa Nui.

⁴See, for example, Bird (2014), Duflo (2005), Hernández (2019), Htun (2004), Pande (2003), and Tan (2014).

the law.⁵ Furthermore, if these reserved seats are captured by organized political parties, they may not represent ethnic minorities but rather the agendas of these parties.

This paper makes two contributions to the existing literature. Methodologically, it introduces innovative techniques for summarizing and analyzing the composition and voting patterns of CC members, offering a comparative advantage over existing methods such as Nominate. Empirically, the study assesses whether members holding reserved seats displayed voting behaviors that diverged from those associated with traditional political organizations. The presence of distinct behaviors among reserved seat members would indicate that these seats successfully introduced diverse perspectives not previously represented. Conversely, a lack of distinct behaviors would challenge the prevailing belief that these members embodied unique ethnic group characteristics.⁶

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a brief overview of the data used. Section 3 examines patterns patterns. Section 4 introduces a metric for assessing similarities among CC members. Section 5 discusses the ideological composition of the CC. Finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks.

2 The data

The 155 members of the CC were elected in elections held on May 15 and 16, 2021. Table 1 details their personal characteristics, highlighting that gender quotas guaranteed a nearly equal male-to-female ratio. The average age of the CC members was 47 years, with a median of 44 years, and approximately 41% were under 41 years old. Finally, most members possessed undergraduate or graduate degrees.

Despite 56% (87 out of 155) of the constituents identifying as independent at the time of election, many joined various coalitions (referred to as collectives) once the sessions commenced. Table 2 displays the final composition

⁵Despite 11% of CC being reserved for ethnic groups, they represented only 4% of the valid votes.

⁶This analysis considers two possibilities: whether ethnic minorities were inadequately represented by established political parties, or whether parties modified their agendas to attract these groups. The primary focus is on determining whether members with reserved seats contributed insights that were not otherwise present in the discourse.

Table 1: Composition of the Constitutional Convention

Gender	Female	77
	Male	78
Age	Less than 30	7
	31-40	56
	41-50	36
	51-60	44
	More than 60	22
Education	High school	7
	Vocational	8
	Undergraduate	81
	Graduate	59

of the CC members.

It is important to note that, although treated as a separate category in Table 2, 8 of the 17 members holding reserved seats eventually joined the “Coordinadora Plurinacional” collective. Subsequent statistical analyses will reveal how their voting patterns compare and contrast with those of the collectives listed in Table 2.

The convention conducted 110 plenary sessions, covering a range of topics from administrative and procedural to substantive issues.⁷ In total, there are records of 4,609 individual votes cast by CC members. The primary focus of the following sections is the voting outcome of individual member i (where $i = 1, \dots, I = 155$) on roll call k (where $k = 1, \dots, K = 4609$):⁸

$$v_i^k = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if individual } i \text{ votes Yes on roll call } k \\ 0 & \text{if individual } i \text{ votes No on roll call } k \end{cases} . \quad (1)$$

3 The votes

This section analyzes the behavior of the 4,609 votes cast during the plenary sessions of the CC. The initial focus is on the percentage of Yes votes for

⁷For more details, see <https://www.chileconvencion.cl/documentos/>

⁸This analysis considers only valid responses for each proposal: Yes (Approve) or No (Reject), excluding abstentions and non-votes.

Table 2: List of Collectives

Collective	Members
Chile Digno (PC, FRVS, PRO)	11
Colectivo del Apruebo (PPD, DC)	7
Colectivo Socialista (PS)	16
Coordinadora Plurinacional	9
Frente Amplio	17
Independientes + UDI	21
Independientes RN-Evopoli	16
Independientes por una Nueva Constitución	13
Movimientos Sociales Constituidos	12
Pueblo Constituyente	11
Otros	5
Reserved seats	17

each roll call, defined as:

$$V_c^k = \frac{\sum_{i \in c} v_i^k}{I_c},$$


representing the percentage of Yes votes among all the I_c individuals in group c .⁹

Figure 1 illustrates the nonparametric estimates of the vote density functions for different member types of the CC. Analyzing the votes of all the members, we observe a distribution with three modes: near 100% (indicating near-unanimous votes), around 75%, and around 25%. These modes closely mirror the CC’s ideological composition, with 76% (118 out of 155) of members leaning left. The gender-differentiated vote distributions also exhibit three modes, but with women’s votes more polarized than men’s.

Vote distributions by collective reveal more heterogeneity, as shown in Figure 2. Panels (a) and (b) display vote distributions for center-left (Colectivo del Apruebo) and center-right (RN+Evopoli) collectives, respectively. Notably, panel (a) shows a less pronounced distribution. The extreme panels (c and d) represent the left-leaning Chile Digno and right-leaning UDI

⁹For instance, V^k is the percentage of Yes votes for all CC members for roll call k , and V_{Female}^k is the percentage of Yes votes for all female members.

Figure 1: Distribution of votes




NOTES: Density functions estimated using the bandwidth proposed by Silverman's (1986) and the Epanechnikov kernel. The horizontal axis represent the fraction of Yes votes.

collectives, respectively, with modes at distribution extremes.¹⁰ Panel (c) also includes the vote distribution of members with reserved seats, closely resembling that of Chile Digno.

Table 3 indicates that the votes of reserved seats are highly correlated with those of five collectives identified as Group 2 (Chile Digno, Coordinadora Plurinacional, Movimientos Sociales Constituidos, Pueblo Constituyente, and Otros), and to a lesser extent, Group 1 (Colectivo Socialista, Frente Amplio, and Independientes por una Nueva Constitución). The correlation with Colectivo del Apruebo is positive but lower, and negative with center-right and right-wing collectives (RN+Evopoli and UDI). These asso-

¹⁰The majority of CC members being left-leaning influenced the distribution, with the main mode in panel (c) leaning towards approvals, and the opposite for panel (d).

Figure 2: Distribution of votes by collective



NOTES: Density functions estimated using the bandwidth proposed by Silverman's (1986) and the Epanechnikov kernel. The horizontal axis represent the fraction of Yes votes.

ciations hold using Spearman's rank-order correlation.¹¹

This analysis suggests that the voting behavior of reserved seats closely aligns with Chile Digno and Group 2. To test the robustness of Table 3's results, we employ a linear probability model:

$$\Pr[v_i^k = 1] = \alpha_k + \beta_k' x_i + \sum \delta_l^k h_i^l, \quad (2)$$

where x includes personal characteristics (gender, age, age squared, geo-

¹¹As noted by Sheskin (2000), Spearman's coefficient allows for a non-linear, monotonic relationship between variables.

Table 3: Correlation of votes of Reserved Seats and Other Collectives

Collective	Pearson	Spearman
Reserved Seats	1.000	1.000
Chile Digno (PC, FRVS, PRO)	0.879	0.736
Colectivo del Apruebo (PPD, DC)	0.192	0.204
Colectivo Socialista (PS)	0.688	0.600
Coordinadora Plurinacional	0.933	0.791
Frente Amplio	0.727	0.653
UDI	-0.585	-0.499
RN-Evopoli	-0.398	-0.329
Independientes por una Nueva Constitución	0.680	0.567
Movimientos Sociales Constituidos	0.902	0.748
Pueblo Constituyente	0.905	0.683
Otros	0.914	0.776
Group 1	0.756	0.623
Group 2	0.955	0.790
Left	0.931	0.745
Right	-0.529	-0.448
Total	0.827	0.677

NOTES: Group 1: Colectivo Socialista + Frente Amplio + Independientes por una Nueva Constitución. Group 2: Chile Digno + Coordinadora Plurinacional + Movimientos Sociales Constituidos + Pueblo Constituyente + Otros.

graphic area, and education) and h_i^l indicates membership in collective l .¹²

Denoting by $\delta_R^k, \delta_R^{G_1}, \delta_R^{G_2}$ the coefficients of (2) estimated for the members of the reserved seats, Group 1, and Group 2 respectively, we aim to test if there are statistical differences between them by evaluating the the null hypotheses:

$$H_0 : \delta_R^k = \delta_R^{G_1}, H_0 : \delta_R^k = \delta_R^{G_2}.$$

Of the 4,609 votes, 4,157 binary response models are estimable. The remaining 452 votes are excluded due to unanimous or near-unanimous out-

¹²The control group in this model is Colectivo del Apruebo, presumed to be in the middle of the ideological spectrum.

comes or perfect collinearity among regressors.¹³

Table 4 reveals that in approximately 93% of the votes, there is no significant difference between the voting behavior of reserved seat members and those in Groups 1 and/or 2.

Table 4: How different are the votes of Reserved seats?

	Group 2 Same	Group 2 Different	Total
Group 1 Same	2428	254	2682
Group 2 Different	1151	324	1475
Total	3579	578	4157

NOTES: Group 1(2) Same: The null hypothesis that the coefficients associated with Reserved seats and Group 1(2) is not rejected. Group 1(2) Different: The null hypothesis that the coefficients associated with Reserved seats and Group 1(2) is rejected. Group 1: Colectivo Socialista + Frente Amplio + Independientes por una Nueva Constitución. Group 2: Chile Digno + Coordinadora Plurinacional + Movimientos Sociales Constituidos + Pueblo Constituyente + Otros.

In the 327 instances where statistical differences were observed, only in 97 cases did the coefficients for reserved seats and Groups 1 or 2 differ in sign. This finding suggests that in nearly 98% of cases, the behavior of reserved seat members is statistically indistinguishable from that of Group 1, and especially Group 2.¹⁴

4 Similarities

This section examines whether individual members holding reserved seats in the CC offered unique perspectives distinct from established political coalitions. To assess this, we construct a “similarity index” $S_{i,j}$ to compare the

¹³Linear probability models are preferred here due to numerical instability in some Probit or Logit models. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used. All GAUSS codes are available upon request.

¹⁴While the voting behavior of reserved seats often aligns with Group 2, it sometimes resembles Group 1. However, as Table 3 shows, Groups 1 and 2 generally voted similarly, and reserved seat members’ votes aligned with them.

voting records of individuals i and j :

$$s_{i,j}^k = \begin{cases} 1 & v_i^k = v_j^k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad S_{i,j} = K^{-1} \sum_{k=1}^K s_{i,j}^k. \quad (3)$$

Here, $S_{i,j}$ represents the percentage of times individuals i and j voted the same way (either Yes or No) across all roll calls.¹⁵

This index can be used to evaluate how similar is the voting record of individual i to the members of group c by computing:

$$S_i^c = \frac{\sum_{j \in c} S_{i,j}}{I_c}.$$

Thus, we can compare how similar an individual is to the members of a specific collective by averaging the similarity indexes of individual i with respect to all members of that collective.

Table 5: Similarities: Descriptive statistics

Collective	Average	Std. Dev.	Pearson	Spearman
Reserved seats	0.915	0.029	1.000	1.000
Chile Digno	0.879	0.033	0.962	0.953
Colectivo del Apruebo	0.613	0.041	0.145	0.130
Colectivo Socialista	0.793	0.043	0.418	0.414
Coordinadora Plurinacional	0.907	0.032	0.192	0.199
Frente Amplio	0.831	0.024	0.445	0.395
UDI	0.231	0.017	-0.394	-0.184
RN-Evopoli	0.358	0.039	-0.197	0.037
Indep. por Nueva Const.	0.806	0.036	0.459	0.412
Mov. Sociales Constituidos	0.913	0.007	0.796	0.765
Pueblo Constituyente	0.900	0.030	0.856	0.846
Otros	0.884	0.080	0.793	0.740
Group 1	0.811	0.049	0.440	0.390
Group 2	0.898	0.045	0.981	0.978

¹⁵It is noteworthy that $S_{i,i} = 1$ as an individual votes identically to themselves, and the index is symmetric ($S_{i,j} = S_{j,i}$).

Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the similarity index for various collectives. If the reserved seats were offering unique insights not represented in the CC, one would expect them to have relatively low similarity indexes compared to other collectives. Contrarily, the reserved seats exhibit the highest similarity indexes, with minimal dispersion, indicating a strikingly uniform voting behavior despite representing diverse ethnic groups and populations. The similarity indexes of reserved seat members are highly correlated with the collectives of Chile Digno and, more broadly, Group 2.

Table 6: Similarities: OLS

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	Prob.
Constant	0.6713	0.0188	0.0000
Female	0.0025	0.0026	0.3351
Age	-0.0013	0.0008	0.1153
Age squared	0.0000	0.0000	0.0954
High School	-0.0081	0.0048	0.0922
Vocational	-0.0077	0.0049	0.1204
Undergraduate	-0.0037	0.0033	0.2529
Metropolitan region	-0.0039	0.0036	0.2778
UDI	-0.2004	0.0080	0.0000
RN-Evopoli	-0.1069	0.0099	0.0000
Group 1	0.0794	0.0072	0.0000
Group 2	0.0728	0.0075	0.0000
Reserved seats	0.0731	0.0083	0.0000
R-squared	0.9769	Mean dep. var	0.6577
Adjusted R-squared	0.9749	S.D. dep. var	0.1034
S.E. of regression	0.0164	Observations	155

Table 6 further corroborates these findings. When analyzing the determinants of similarity indexes for each member, personal characteristics (such as age, education, gender, or geographic origin) are not significant. However, collective affiliation plays a crucial role. Notably, the similarity index for reserved seats is almost identical to that of Group 2, using Colectivo del Apruebo as the control group.

In summary, this section demonstrates that individual members of the CC with reserved seats were very similar to each other, and their voting patterns

were particularly aligned with those of Group 2 members. This suggests that the behavior of reserved seat representatives was not meaningfully differentiated from that of established collectives.

5 The issues

This section assesses the ideological persuasions of the Constitutional Convention (CC) members, including those with reserved seats, 76% of whom align with left-leaning collectives. We analyze their voting behavior to determine their ideological positions.

A common method for this classification is NOMINATE, which uses numerical methods to estimate ideological positions based on observed votes.¹⁶

Here, we adopt an alternative approach using the similarity index developed in the previous section. This method involves comparing the actual votes of CC members with a theoretical benchmark vote, representing a right-leaning (or left-leaning) stance on specific issues. For this purpose, we define:

$$d_i^k = \begin{cases} 1 & v_i^k = w^k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad , \quad D_i = K^{-1} \sum_{k=1}^K d_i^k. \quad (4)$$

where w^k is the expected vote of a right-leaning (or left-leaning) individual on roll call k , and D_i is the percentage of times individual i voted as the benchmark voter would.

This approach, compared to NOMINATE, simplifies the process once the benchmark voter’s stance is established for each issue.¹⁷ The challenge lies in defining the benchmark voter’s choice for each roll call and ensuring that the issues are voted on differently based on political persuasion.

Out of the 4,609 votes analyzed, 1,452 were identified as having clear ideological divides, with 811 classified as economic and 641 as social issues. We determined the benchmark voter’s choices for these votes independently

¹⁶See Armstrong et al. (2014) and references therein. Gentzkow et al. (2017) offer another method for classifying ideological positions based on speech.

¹⁷For instance, using NOMINATE to estimate the left-right classification of the CC members requires estimating $I + 2K + 1$ parameters. A two-dimensional classification (for example, economic and social issues) would require to estimate twice that number of parameters.

of how specific individuals or collectives voted.¹⁸

Using this method provides a natural way to classify individual ideological persuasions based on their voting record compared to a consistent ideological benchmark.¹⁹ Notably, the correlation between D_i and the vector estimated with NOMINATE is 0.94, indicating that our similarity index closely aligns with NOMINATE results but is simpler to compute and interpret.²⁰

Figure 3 shows the nonparametric estimates of the D_i distributions. The results indicate extreme polarization among CC members, with a majority leaning left, especially on economic issues.

Table 7 presents descriptive statistics of D_i for different collectives, revealing that reserved seats are on the extreme left of the distribution with minimal dispersion.²¹

Table 8 reports the results of an OLS estimation determining the political positions of CC members using D_i as the dependent variable, controlling for personal characteristics and collective affiliations.²²

Using a male from the Colectivo del Apruebo as the baseline, the analysis shows that female members are marginally more left-leaning, but other personal characteristics are not significant predictors of political persuasion. UDI and RN+Evopoli are to the right of Colectivo del Apruebo, while Groups 1, 2, and reserved seats are to the left, with the coefficient for reserved seats almost identical to that of Group 2. The model precisely characterizes the variable of interest.

Figure 4 illustrates the nonparametric estimation of the political persuasions of members with reserved seats. Consistent with previous findings, they are positioned on the extreme left, particularly on economic issues. The pres-

¹⁸I extend my gratitude to Jorge Abela and Paola Soux for their assistance in reviewing each of the 4,609 votes, classifying them, and defining the benchmark voter's choices.


¹⁹In this one-dimensional approach, we determine how a right-leaning (or left-leaning) person should vote. For economic issues, the benchmark is based on a preference for free markets (or interventionism). Social issues are classified based on a benchmark favoring personal freedom and equal treatment under the law.

²⁰Furthermore, the usage of Artificial Intelligence can provide even more advantages to the usage of this method, as one can prompt an application such as ChatGPT to vote a given proposition assuming a given political stance. The results of such exercise are similar to the results reported here, where humans determined the benchmark votes.

²¹In fact, one member with a reserved seat is the farthest to the left among all CC members.

²²In fact, one member with a reserved seat is the farthest to the left among all CC members.

Figure 3: Distribution of ideological positions



NOTES: Density functions estimated using the bandwidth proposed by Silverman's (1986) and the Epanechnikov kernel. The horizontal axis represent the similarity with the benchmark voter of the right.

ence of two modes suggests that while reserved seat members were generally aligned with Group 2's votes, some exhibited marginally different behaviors.

6 Concluding remarks

The distribution of the CC was far from conventional by any standard. Whether considering the voting patterns or the ideological persuasions of its members, the CC was characterized by extreme polarization. There were few moderate positions, with a significant majority of members skewed towards the extreme left of the ideological spectrum.

This was particularly evident in the case of the reserved seats. Despite representing eight distinct ethnic groups with diverse geographical, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds, their voting behavior showed little variation. Statistically, their actions were indistinguishable from those of the most left-

Table 7: One dimension: Descriptive statistics

Collective	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Std.Dev.
Total	0.357	0.195	0.941	0.103	0.302
Reserved seats	0.132	0.134	0.159	0.103	0.017
Chile Digno	0.146	0.130	0.252	0.105	0.041
Colectivo del Apruebo	0.445	0.434	0.585	0.386	0.072
Colectivo Socialista	0.274	0.279	0.392	0.131	0.085
Coordinadora Plurinacional	0.149	0.147	0.202	0.127	0.022
Frente Amplio	0.211	0.211	0.362	0.138	0.060
UDI	0.914	0.913	0.941	0.884	0.015
RN-Evopoli	0.806	0.824	0.863	0.680	0.053
Indep. por una Nueva Const.	0.237	0.253	0.380	0.122	0.069
Mov. Sociales Constituidos	0.125	0.126	0.143	0.115	0.009
Pueblo Constituyente	0.125	0.125	0.142	0.104	0.012
Otros	0.146	0.116	0.275	0.108	0.072
Group 1	0.240	0.232	0.392	0.122	0.075
Group 2	0.137	0.128	0.275	0.104	0.033
Left	0.195	0.149	0.585	0.103	0.097
Right	0.867	0.902	0.941	0.680	0.065

leaning established organizations.

These findings suggest that the reserved seats did not adequately reflect the diverse viewpoints of the populations they were meant to represent. Instead of bringing unique and idiosyncratic perspectives to the table, their contributions were largely in line with existing far-left ideologies.²³

The behavior of those occupying reserved seats raises concerns about their potential impact on representative democracy. If such practices become widespread, they could lead to increased political fragmentation and the overrepresentation of radicalized groups.

The CC was established with the goal of drafting a constitution that would symbolize ‘everybody’s house’ for Chileans. However, contrary to the


²³Contreras and Morales (2017) provide evidence that ethnic groups tend to favor candidates from their own indigenous populations, but this does not necessarily translate into a unique ideological persuasion.

Table 8: One dimension: OLS

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	Prob.
Constant	0.43662	0.05384	0.00000
Female	-0.02040	0.00827	0.01490
Age	0.00137	0.00213	0.52010
Age squared	-0.00002	0.00002	0.35020
High school	0.00640	0.01295	0.62200
Vocational	0.00348	0.01151	0.76310
Undergraduate	-0.00435	0.00982	0.65840
Metropolitan Region	0.00431	0.01159	0.71050
UDI	0.47292	0.02868	0.00000
RN+Evopoli	0.35986	0.03175	0.00000
Group 1	-0.20515	0.03056	0.00000
Group 2	-0.30510	0.02963	0.00000
Reserved seats	-0.31220	0.02998	0.00000
R-squared	0.97396	Mean dep. var	0.35660
Adjusted R-squared	0.97174	S.D. dep. var	0.30177
S.E. of regression	0.05073	Observations	154

sentiment of the 1983 hit song ‘Our House’ by Madness, the composition of the convention and its outcomes suggest that this ‘house’ was not positioned in the ideological middle of the street.

Figure 4: Distribution of Reserved Seats



NOTES: Density functions estimated using the bandwidth proposed by Silverman's (1986) and the Epanechnikov kernel. The horizontal axis represent the similarity with the benchmark voter of the right.

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A Robustness checks

This Appendix reports some robustness checks for the results.

A.1 The votes

This subsection shows that the results of Section 3 are not affected if we consider only the economic and social issues discussed on Section 5.

Table 9: Correlation of votes of Reserved Seats and Other Collectives


Collective	Economic		Social	
	Pearson	Spearman	Pearson	Spearman
Reserved seats	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Chile Digno	0.878	0.619	0.835	0.642
Colectivo del Apruebo	0.134	0.223	0.068	0.103
Colectivo Socialista	0.624	0.455	0.646	0.512
Coordinadora Plurinacional	0.926	0.805	0.926	0.737
Frente Amplio	0.671	0.466	0.768	0.580
UDI	-0.683	-0.380	-0.704	-0.488
RN-Evopoli	-0.452	-0.241	-0.569	-0.321
Indep. por una Nueva Const.	0.615	0.479	0.603	0.463
Mov. Sociales Constituidos	0.883	0.684	0.881	0.621
Pueblo Constituyente	0.905	0.722	0.891	0.695
Otros	0.905	0.757	0.899	0.711
Group 1	0.714	0.480	0.749	0.538
Group 2	0.949	0.662	0.944	0.664
Left	0.924	0.620	0.919	0.664
Right	-0.583	-0.325	-0.652	-0.348
Total	0.794	0.577	0.794	0.577

NOTES: Group 1: Colectivo Socialista + Frente Amplio + Independientes por una Nueva Constitución. Group 2: Chile Digno + Coordinadora Plurinacional + Movimientos Sociales Constituidos + Pueblo Constituyente + Otros.

A.2 The issues

This subsection shows that the results of Section 5 are not affected if we consider economic and social issues separately.

Figure 5: Economic versus Social Issues



NOTES: Values closer to 1 indicate more preference towards economic (social) freedoms.

Table 10: Economic issues: Descriptive statistics

Collective	Mean	Max	Min	Std.Dev.
Total	0.341	0.932	0.083	0.287
Reserved seats	0.121	0.144	0.094	0.016
Chile Digno (PC, FRVS, PRO)	0.137	0.263	0.083	0.050
Colectivo del Apruebo (PPD, DC)	0.393	0.532	0.301	0.086
Colectivo Socialista (PS)	0.283	0.412	0.128	0.099
Coordinadora Plurinacional	0.131	0.153	0.103	0.014
Frente Amplio	0.226	0.408	0.134	0.079
UDI	0.880	0.932	0.826	0.031
RN-Evopoli	0.744	0.815	0.592	0.070
Indep. por una Nueva Const.	0.220	0.397	0.097	0.080
Mov. Sociales Constituidos	0.124	0.154	0.112	0.012
Pueblo Constituyente	0.121	0.144	0.090	0.020
Otros	0.142	0.273	0.098	0.074
Group 1	0.244	0.412	0.097	0.089
Group 2	0.130	0.273	0.083	0.035
Left	0.189	0.532	0.083	0.099
Right	0.821	0.932	0.592	0.085

Table 11: Social issues: Descriptive statistics

Collective	Mean	Max	Min	Std.Dev.
Total	0.396	0.925	0.150	0.282
Reserved seats	0.192	0.220	0.161	0.020
Chile Digno (PC, FRVS, PRO)	0.203	0.285	0.150	0.034
Colectivo del Apruebo (PPD, DC)	0.503	0.637	0.458	0.064
Colectivo Socialista (PS)	0.306	0.397	0.190	0.063
Coordinadora Plurinacional	0.218	0.317	0.193	0.038
Frente Amplio	0.240	0.342	0.192	0.036
UDI	0.907	0.925	0.882	0.010
RN-Evopoli	0.832	0.866	0.759	0.031
Indep. por una Nueva Const.	0.291	0.395	0.194	0.056
Mov. Sociales Constituidos	0.177	0.193	0.166	0.007
Pueblo Constituyente	0.177	0.192	0.159	0.012
Otros	0.199	0.316	0.166	0.065
Group 1	0.277	0.397	0.190	0.059
Group 2	0.194	0.317	0.150	0.034
Left	0.245	0.637	0.150	0.090
Right	0.874	0.925	0.759	0.043

Table 12: Economic issues: OLS

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	Prob.
Constant	0.38567	0.07060	0.00000
Female	-0.01990	0.00997	0.04790
Age	0.00140	0.00266	0.60140
Age squared	-0.00002	0.00003	0.43400
High school	0.00715	0.01323	0.58950
Vocational	0.00256	0.01297	0.84410
Undergraduate	-0.00310	0.01185	0.79430
RM	0.00895	0.01361	0.51180
UDI	0.48964	0.03579	0.00000
RN+Evopoli	0.34825	0.03956	0.00000
Group 1	-0.15160	0.03759	0.00010
Group 2	-0.26292	0.03619	0.00000
Reserved seats	-0.27168	0.03627	0.00000
R-squared	0.95810	Mean dep. var	0.34092
Adjusted R-squared	0.95453	S.D. dep. var	0.28722
S.E. of regression	0.06124	Observations	154

Table 13: Social issues: OLS

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	Prob.
Constant	0.50109	0.04279	0.00000
Female	-0.01667	0.00678	0.01510
Age	0.00098	0.00162	0.54680
Age squared	-0.00001	0.00002	0.35170
High school	0.00391	0.01170	0.73840
Vocational	0.00390	0.01002	0.69790
Undergraduate	-0.00595	0.00801	0.45890
RM	0.00169	0.00958	0.86050
UDI	0.40693	0.02448	0.00000
RN+Evopoli	0.32819	0.02578	0.00000
Group 1	-0.22593	0.02593	0.00000
Group 2	-0.30661	0.02582	0.00000
Reserved seats	-0.31175	0.02606	0.00000
R-squared	0.97992	Mean dep. var	0.39597
Adjusted R-squared	0.97822	S.D. dep. var	0.28172
S.E. of regression	0.04158	Observations	154